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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an econometric model intended to explain fundamental cross-country differences in 
the quality of national economic institutions by using the set of economic, geographical, cultural and 
historical factors. Our key research hypothesis claims that bilateral trade may be working as a critical 
channel for institutional evolution, including through import of institutions by less developed countries 
from their more institutionally advanced trade partners. We follow logic of the modified gravity model of 
foreign trade to justify the model specification. Econometric analysis was conducted on the performance 
data of more than 100 countries in 1996-2006. Our results support the hypothesis that many factors that 
drive international institutional differences are identical to those that define intensity of trade interactions 
in the traditional gravity model. As a result, global institutional progress has been showing particular 
historic and geographical patterns. We come to the conclusion that, after controlling for differences in the 
levels of per capita income, institutional cross-country differences are significantly influenced by 
countries’ location and geographic neighborhood, and with time countries tend to form homogeneous 
geographic clusters by the level of institutional development.  
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Introduction  
 
A major theoretical and empirical contribution of institutional economics relates to its emphasis 
on the links between cross-country differences in income and variation in the quality of national 
institutions, which include such components as effectiveness of property rights protection, 
contract enforcement, transparency and independence of the judicial system, quality and 
accountability of governance, depth and stability of financial markets, etc. This in turns poses a 
question: what may explain differences in quality of institutions across countries? 
This paper attempts to contribute to empirical analysis of institutional development and to 
explain international differences in quality of institutions using the framework of the gravity 
model of trade. Traditionally the gravity model is employed to explain international trade flows 
with geographic distances between trade partners, sizes of their economies and some other 
geographic, political and historic factors2. This paper uses logic of modified gravity model to 
suggest a new way to analyze and explain cross-country differences in institutional development. 
A key feature of our model relates to the introduction of a particular dependent variable -- 
institutional distance between two countries (used as an explanatory variable in the model 
instead of trade flows between them).3 
Our modeling approach is based on the following central hypothesis: institutional differences 
between two countries are negatively correlated with the intensity of their bilateral trade. To 
support higher volumes of mutual trade countries need to make adjustments in their economic 
institutions and ensure some degree of their compatibility. Trade-related needs are an important 
driver of institutional innovation, which often takes place the form of institutional imports 
(borrowing new institutions from a more institutionally developed trade partner). In this 
framework, various traditional drivers of intensity of bilateral trade commonly employed by 
various modifications of the gravity model (such as geographic distances, existence of common 
                                                          
2 For example, Tinbergen (1962) 
3 Non-trade applications of gravity model are rather common. Some examples of such applications include Frankel 
and Rose (2005), Hahm and Shin (2009) and are reviewed below. 
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border, membership in the same economic bloc, etc.) would also be the factors that shape core 
institutional differences between the countries. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly surveys literature on the inter-links 
between institutions, geography, trade, and economic growth. Section 2 presents our modified 
gravity model and discusses specifications and hypotheses that are tested in this paper. The 
results of econometric estimation are presented in section 3. The last section concludes by 
suggesting possible interpretation of our results. 
 
1. Literature Review 
Institutions and Growth 
The contemporary economic theory puts a heavy emphasis on importance of institutions for 
economic development. It is commonly admitted that stability and effectiveness of institutions 
are the basic condition for the flow of investments and development of entrepreneurship. One of 
the authoritative papers in this field, “Institutions Rule”, by Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, 
and Francesco Trebbi (2002) shows that in the multi-country regressions institutional quality 
(first of all, indicators for the quality of property rights and legal system) explains the difference 
in the long-run growth rates better than other fundamental factors. According to their results, 
improvement in institutional quality by one standard deviation corresponds to an increase in per 
capita income by a factor of 6.4, which is equivalent to the actual difference in GDP per capita 
between, e.g., Bolivia and South Korea. 
While neoclassical and endogenous growth theory frameworks treat investment in physical 
capital, human capital, knowledge, and innovations as the primary determinants of the economic 
growth, institutional approach considers investments along with other factors as a consequence 
of formation and improvement in effectiveness of the institutional framework. For example, poor 
property rights enforcement results in lower investment to GDP ratio as compared to a similar 
economy with better enforcement. In the institutional environment with poorly protected 
property rights entrepreneurs opt for suboptimal, from the growth prospective, means and 
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amounts of capital investment.4 Owners of factors of production are usually ready to make 
sufficient investments in the development of these factors if and only if they are sure that their 
property rights are secured properly. 
Therefore, precise determination of property rights and their effective enforcement is one of the 
key determinants of successful economic development. Respectively, weak property protection 
and poor quality of the institutional environment are in general the main barriers to economic 
growth, especially in developing countries.5  Robert Barro (1996) in his prominent paper 
“Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study” uses such institutional 
indicators as quality of property rights protection and rule of law as the main determinants of 
development. Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1995) showed that weak property rights 
protection affects economic growth negatively. Mancur Olson and his colleagues6 emphasized 
the role of modernization of formal and informal institutions in the post-World War II Germany 
and Japan for growth acceleration in those countries. The new economic structures created there 
according to the principles of free and competitive markets replaced monopolistic structures that 
were dominating before the WWII. This change promoted fast recovery and further development 
of German and Japanese economies.  
It is worth emphasizing that institutional factors are significant in the models that look for 
explanation of the long run growth and international differences in the levels of per capita 
income. Attempts to explain short-run differences in growth rates with institutional variables 
have produced the results that are statistically less significant and less robust.7 However, such 
results are consistent with research findings of the episodes of growth acceleration in different 
countries around the world. Often no fundamental improvement of local institutions is necessary 
to trigger such growth acceleration. Growth can start without such changes if it’s possible to 
weaken effect of other, non-institutional barriers to development (Hausmann, Pritchett, and 
                                                          
4 E.g., see illustration of this idea in the model by Lindner, Strulik (1999) 
5 E.g. Clague (1997) 
6 Analysis of new institutional approach and analysis of institutional changes in Germany and Japan are presented in 
Mancur Olson’s chapter “The New Institutional Economics: The Collective Choice Approach to Economic 
Development” in Clague (1997) and in the paper by Keefer, Knack (1997). 
7 Hausmann, Pritchett, Rodrik (2005) 
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Rodrik, 2005). Experiences of China and India are the illustration of successful growth that 
started before any serious institutional change took place. These countries launched large-scale 
institutional reforms only after their economies grew at a high rate for several years. 
To the contrary, over the longer time period the role of institutional factors is critical. To sustain 
growth without improvement of institutions is difficult, often not possible, i.e. the initial 
acceleration of development fails to become stable, unless adequate institutions are in place. This 
is a fundamental weakness of growth patterns in authoritarian and non-market economies. The 
former are quite capable to generate impressive short-run growth rates by means of mobilization 
of their internal resources, but, as a rule, they are unable to maintain that growth over a relatively 
long time intervals. 
Literature on the role of institutions in the economic growth makes a special emphasis on two 
groups of institutional factors. These are the quality of legal system and the level of financial 
system development. A 1997-1998 series of papers by Andrei Shleifer, Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Robert Vishny presented the results of empirical study of the 
relationship between the quality of national legal institutions and growth. The authors argued that 
the type of legal system (either Anglo-Saxon system of common law or French civil law system) 
promoted or, correspondingly, hindered protection of private property rights and, therefore, 
positively or negatively affected the rate of financial markets development, level of private 
investment, and economic dynamics. The authors showed that the adaptation of the French civil 
law system creates risks for excessive administrative regulation of the economy as well as 
particular legal risks – risks of the redundant judicial formalism, greater complication and 
prolongation of legal procedures – that increase costs of law enforcement8. 
Results of Andrei Shleifer et al. (1997, 1998) were elaborated by Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-
Kunt, Ross Levine, and Vojislav Maksimovic (2001). Their contribution was the demonstration 
of the fact that the type of legal system impacts economic growth not directly but rather through 
                                                          
 8A significant part in the realization of property rights protection is assigned to real independence of the judiciary. 
The model of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Cristian Pop-Eleches, Andrei Shleifer (2004) shows that 
the countries whose national judiciary has greater independence and where the property rights are protected to the 
fuller extent have the institutional environment that is more favorable for intensive economic growth.  
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the operations of financial markets, namely a degree of their development or their “depth”. Thus, 
the role of financial services is crucial for successful realization of investment projects and 
respectively stable economic growth. Countries with more developed financial markets, ceteris 
paribus, receive greater capital investment flows as compared to countries with weaker financial 
institutions. According to Jeffrey Wurgler (2000) this effect is more prominent in high-tech 
industries, which tend to benefit the most from the availability of credit resources and investment 
funding in the economy. 
This strand of research was a sequel to the earlier studies by Robert King and Ross Levine 
(1993a, 1993b), who used the data on 80 countries to confirm close relationship between the 
depth of national financial systems, on one hand, and the long-run growth rates, rate of capital 
accumulation and improvement in effectiveness of capital stock utilization, on the other hand. 
Moreover, the attained level of development of the national financial sector – measured with 
such indicators as the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP or the private loans to GDP ratio – 
correlates strongly with future growth rates.  
Endogeneity problem 
At present the economics mainstream does not question the existence of stable and statistically 
significant correlation between the quality of national institutions and the level of economic 
development. But with few exceptions (see p. 11), no analysis was undertaken yet on factors that 
may explain cross-country variation in the quality of institutions. Main discussions are centered 
instead on further elaboration of the causal relationship between institutions and growth. One of 
the central puzzles in the field is the endogeneity problem: whether institutions is the initial 
source of growth or, to the contrary, development of the institutions and their subsequent 
influence is itself the result of some other, deeper growth determinants. 
The economic theory attributes growth determinants using terminology of Dani Rodrik (2003)9 
either to the group of proximate or to the group of fundamental or deep factors. Conventional for 
the neoclassical models factors, such as labor, capital, and productivity comprise the group of 
                                                          
9 The original framework of Rodrik does not incorporate all potential factors of growth, but his methodology is 
consistent with the contemporary view of the process of economic growth.  
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proximate factors. To the group of fundamental factors Rodrik attributes quality of national 
institutions, international trade, 10 and geographical characteristics of the country, such as 
availability of natural resources, climate, distance from the equator, accessibility to sea trade 
routes. Of all the above mentioned fundamental factors of growth only geography is apparently 
an exogenous factor, whereas institutions and international trade are shaped to a substantial 
degree by the national economic policy. 
The above classification of growth factors is consistent with a number of critically important 
studies in the area of economic development, some of which are summarized below.  
In 2001 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, James Robinson published the research results, in 
which legal institutions are claimed to be the fundamental factor of growth. The authors used 
data on malaria mortality that European setters confronted in the period of XVII – XIX centuries 
in the New World, i.e. in Africa, Asia, America, and Australia, as well as the data on density of 
aboriginal population. These two variables, malaria mortality and indigenous population density, 
were used as proxies for a long-run trajectory of institutional development of these territories. 
Along with a set of control variables these two variables satisfactory explain large part of 
present-day cross-country differences in the quality of property rights protection. Acemoglu et al. 
interpreted this result as follows: European settlers migrated largely to the new territories with 
sparsely distributed native population and relatively moderate climate. Such characteristics of 
new lands led to replication of European institutional traditions and legal systems in those areas. 
Whereas in the territories with hostile for Europeans climate and high density of local population 
metropolis established a system of centralized colonial governance and used practice of 
extractive farming with heavy exploitation of native people. In these countries import of 
institutions from metropolis was quite limited. 
Differences between these two types of colonization, Neo-Europes vs. extractive states, just 
deepened over the past centuries, including the period that started when the former colonies 
obtained independence. As Acemoglu et al. show, these early exploration and settlement 
differences have resulted in significant differences in the present quality of institutional 
                                                          
10 Rodrik et al. refer to international trade as to “integration view” to emphasize the integrating role of the trade for 
market operations. 
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environment, as measured by the effectiveness of property rights indicator. In their own turn, 
institutional differences were the decisive factor of divergence in long-run growth rates across 
the colonized territories and countries. 
In spite of elegance of Acemoglu et al. arguments, Andrei Shleifer, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La 
Porta, and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (2004) questioned these results based on their own 
research, in which they argued that it is not the institutions that are the core driver of variation in 
economic growth, but the quality of human capital. Shleifer et al. noted that besides institutions 
settlers have imported to the colonies human capital, and furthermore, causality could go from 
human capital to legal institutions, and only then from institutions – to growth. 
Quite opposite approach can be found in the paper by John Gallup, Jeffrey Sachs, and Andrew 
Mellinger (1999), who used only geographical factors to validate their hypothesis that geography 
crucially impacted both institutional development and growth. The authors improved upon the 
theoretical framework of such scholars as Fernand Braudel (1972, 1981-1984) and Jared 
Diamond (1997) and based on the results of their own empirical study came to a conclusion that 
geography is a fundamental factor of economic growth that determines subsequent developments 
of both human capital and the quality of institutions. Authors justified primacy of geography by 
the strict exogeneity of geographical factors, i.e. independence of national geographic 
characteristics from the pursued policy. In their work Gallup et al. analyzed such main 
geographic variables as location in the North of South hemisphere, distance from the sea trade 
routes, and type of climatic patterns. According to their results, the most advantageous for the 
long-run growth combination of geographical factors includes location in the North hemisphere, 
access to the sea trade routes, and moderate climate. Notice that favorable geographic 
characteristics positively relate to growth, on one hand, directly through lower transport costs 
and better health of population, greater crop productivity and higher birth rate of livestock, 
presence of natural resources and low cost of their extraction, and, on the other, indirectly 
through the age of settlements and density of population, both of which encourage growth 
through the agglomeration effect. 
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William Easterly and Ross Levine (2003) and Dani Rodrick, Arvind Subramanian, and 
Francesco Trebbi (2002) almost simultaneously conducted a research and presented the models 
that included three fundamental factors of growth (institutions, trade, and geography). 
Easterly and Levine did not find statistically significant support for the effect of key economic 
policy variables, including macroeconomic policy, participation in the international trade, and 
limits on capital movement, on growth. However, institutional variables influenced growth 
significantly and positively in that study. 
The institutional development index played a key role for Easterley & Levine’s analysis. This 
index was based on 6 institutional characteristics originally suggested in a series of papers by 
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, Pablo Zoido-Lobatón (1999a, 1999b), which developed into a 
family of World Bank World Development Indicators (WB WGI). Those characteristics 
summarize international differences in the quality of institutions for a large sample of countries 
according to the following dimensions: 
1. Voice and accountability – measure of civil rights (freedom of expression, freedom of 
association), freedom of media, and accountability of government authorities; 
2. Political stability and absence of violence – probability of change of the national 
government by non-constitutional mechanisms; 
3. Government effectiveness – measure of quality of civic service and public sector 
services, competence of governmental officials, and credibility of government’s 
commitment to announced policies; 
4. Regulatory quality – measure of governmental involvement as well as quality of such 
involvement in operations of the commodity markets and banking system, degree of 
administrative control in the area of the new business start-ups, control of private sector 
operations and international trade; 
5. Rule of law – degree of protection of individuals and their property from violence and 
theft, independence and effectiveness of judicial system, effectiveness of contract 
enforcement, and property rights; 
6. Control of corruption – measure of abuse of governmental power to satisfy private 
interests. 
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As noted above, Dani Rodrik et al. (2002) conducted a conceptually similar study and analyzed 
impact of institutions, geography, and international trade11. Similarly to Rodrik et al., Easterly 
and Levine made a conclusion that institutional variables have the best explanatory power for 
cross-country differences in the levels of economic development as compared to the other 
fundamental factors. However, these authors do not entirely reject influence of geography on 
economic growth, but argue that its influence is not direct, but rather stems indirectly through 
institutions.  
Sensitivity of such econometric results to the specification changes and choice of institutional 
and geographical variables led to a paper by Jeffrey Sachs “Institutions Don’t Rule” in 2003, in 
which he published the results that are different from those obtained by Easterly and Levine 
(2003) and Rodrik et al. (2002). His model included both institutional and geographic factors, 
but unlike his opponents, the estimates for geographic variables in his specification were 
significant. As a result, Sachs insisted on accuracy of his original conclusions that institutions 
could not completely explain international differences in growth and that part of the unexplained 
residual can be attributed to the geographic determinants. 
 
What may explain cross-country institutional differences? 
While profession seems to agree that institutions are critical for economic development, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to statistical identification of factors that could explain 
cross-country variation in the quality of institutions. We managed to identify only a limited 
number of academic papers that focus on this research question. The common feature of these 
papers is that they tend to explain institutional variation in terms of differences in social 
characteristics of respective communities/nations and as such they focus on variables that for a 
mainstream economist sound as “almost anthropological”.  
For instance, Paulo Mauro (1995) pointed to importance of integrity of society for stability of 
institutions. This author based his analysis on the results of a model that used ethnolinguistic 
                                                          
11 It is worth noting that as a measure of institutional quality Rodrick et al. used the rule of law index from the same 
WB WGI dataset by Kaufmann et al. that was utilized by Easterly and Levine.  
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fractionalization indicator12 for explanation of corruption persistence in the society and 
government, i.e. degree of “underdevelopment” of national institutions. According to Mauro’s 
research, countries with a highly developed sense of national identity, i.e. socially coherent 
states, ceteris paribus, have more developed and more stable national institutions, and, therefore, 
better prospects for economic growth. 
William Easterly developed his earlier work and modified his approach to the analysis of 
institutions. In the 2006 paper William Easterly, Jozef Ritzan, and Michael Woolcock still 
consider institutions to be the crucial growth factor, but they do not treat them as a strictly 
exogenous factor. Instead, Easterly at al. treat social cohesion as the initial driver of growth, 
though again acting through the institutions. The authors argue that the state of society in terms 
of its cohesion at least partially determines strength of national institutions. 
When members of the society do not trust each other, do not take an active civil position, and 
where income inequality is high, formation of effective institutions, i.e. stable generally accepted 
“rules of the game”, is hindered. And vice versa, in a coherent society it is much easier to 
implement necessary reforms: citizens trust their government and, in particular, are ready to 
accept official arguments about withstanding short-run difficulties of reformation to be rewarded 
with the expected in the long-run benefits of the reforms. Common values of the society, which 
are related to the societal cultural and religious foundations and depth of linguistic differences, 
are another characteristic of social cohesion in Easterly et al. model. 
The given above definition of social cohesion is close to the notion of social capital, introduced 
by Robert Putnam and John Helliwell (1995) for the study of social interaction at the micro level. 
In particular, Robert Putnam used this notion for analysis of the civil society in different regions 
of Italy and for the study of relationship between different social characteristics and economic 
growth. Proposed approach to the measurement of social capital takes into account the degree of 
citizen’s participation in local community activities, participation in elections, membership in 
parties and various civic organizations. The authors claimed that there is a causal relationship 
                                                          
12 The indicator is calculated as probability that 2 randomly selected citizens of one country belong to the same 
ethnolinguistic group and, consequently, have the common cultural norms and values. 
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from social capital and degree of the civil society development to institutions and economic 
growth. 
In our paper we intend to identify an alternative set of characteristics that could explain cross-
country variation in the quality of institutions. Our key hypothesis on the nature of institutional 
evolution and institutional conversion is centered on international trade dynamics. In short, we 
believe that factors driving growth in bilateral trade would also support bilateral institutional 
conversion. The following section provides some additional justification for this hypothesis. 
Here we just would like to make two upfront comments on peculiarities of our way of looking 
into factors of institutional development. First, its emphasis on trade allows for effective 
utilization of the methodology, in particular gravity model framework, developed in the last 
decades by mainstream economics for analysis of trade flows. Second, given strong inter-
linkages between trade, growth, and institutions, highlighted in the literature review above, our 
statistical analysis is designed to minimize potential distortions associated with endogeneity. 
 
2. Model & Data  
 
Gravity Model of Trade 
Known to physicists since Isaac Newton’s works, the gravity model was originally applied to the 
study of international trade by Jan Tinbergen (1962). Since then, the model quickly gained in 
popularity and was used by many other economists. The functional form of the gravity model, 
used in economic research is presented in (1).  
 , (1) 
where  Fij – international trade flows between countries i and j, measured, e.g., as sum of their 
exports and imports, 
Mi, Mj – economic masses, e.g., GDP of, respectively, countries i & j, 
Distij  – geographic distances between countries i & j, 
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G – gravitational constant. 
 
Numerous studies have shown that the gravity model (GM), at large, fits volumes of 
international trade quite satisfactory. Since Tinbergen’s work was published in 1962, multiple 
modifications of the model were introduced. Some of them added new explanatory variables, for 
example, common language, common border, membership in monetary, economic, and/or 
political unions. One of the most prominent examples of GM application at the end of the XX 
century is Jeffrey Frankel (1997). Other extensions modified the explained (LHS) variable to 
adapt the model to study other processes, such as international migration, FDI flows, 
environmental damage, or tourist flows.  
Among the most remarkable GM modifications we would highlight the paper by Elhanan 
Helpman and Paul Krugman (1985), who modified the gravity model for monopolistic 
competition. Stephen Redding and Anthony Venables (2000) used the GM for developing the 
new economic geography framework. Joon-Ho Hahm and Kwanho Shin (2009) analyzed 
international financial integration, namely worldwide distribution of such financial assets as bank 
loans, long- and short-term debts, and portfolio equity holdings. Treating international allocation 
of financial assets as an explained variable, the authors used a traditional for gravity models set 
of explanatory variables, including GDP, and also included quality of institutional environment. 
In this study we exploit the logic of gravity model not for the analysis of international trade 
flows, but rather for exploration of cross-country differences in the level of institutional 
development. We suppose that international differences in the quality of core economic 
institutions are directly related to intensity of trade interactions between these countries, and as 
such they are directly influenced by the traditional basic factors that determine the volumes of 
bilateral trade, such as the distance between these countries, presence of common border and 
common language. These factors appear to be exogenous not only with regard to the 
international trade characteristics but also with regard to the institutional quality. 
Development of national institutions, according to our hypothesis, is significantly influenced by 
the institutional environment in the neighboring countries and in the countries that are the main 
trade partners. One of important paths for institutional evolution relates to import of institutions 
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from geographical neighbors and trade partners. All factors that decrease transaction cost of 
trading between nations (common culture, geographic proximity, etc.) would support smoothing 
out institutional differences. Moreover, international trade plays a special and probably a key 
role in the process of institutional convergence: to stimulate bilateral trade both trade partners 
have to align their institutions. It seems reasonable to assume that, as the trade turnover grows, 
institutions of the more developed partner would be more often adopted (imported) by the less 
developed counterpart. 
The logic of gravity model was used for this study because this model helps to identify main 
factors that define the intensity of trade between two countries. According to our research logic, 
the main factors used in the gravity model would promote convergence of institutions between 
countries that are engaged in bilateral trade. In other words, we do not use volumes of bilateral 
trade among our explanatory variables. Instead, we use factors which are seen as fundamental 
determinants of such trade flows according to the standard GM specification. Such an approach 
reduces potential endogeneity problems regularly observed in the analysis of interaction between 
trade and institutional development variables. 
We have to admit that at this point we do not have a formal theoretical model to underpin our empirical 
analysis of cross-country institutional differences. Instead, we base our econometric investigation that 
follows on (i) our hypotheses that link cross-border institutional conversion with international trade, and 
(ii) an established tradition of applying the gravity model for studying various socio-economic processes. 
It is worth noting that initially the GM was estimated (see Tinbergen above) without rigorous theoretical 
underpinning. Only 17 years later the respective theory was developed (Anderson, 1979). And as seems 
such “theoretical shallowness” has been rather common in developing various modifications of GM. 
 
For instance, the application of gravity model to analysis of international financial flows (e.g. Martin and 
Rey, 2004) so far has been driven primarily by empirical findings, not so much by theoretical 
considerations. As a rationalization of their model, Hahm and Shin (2009) claim that “the related 
literature indicates that the gravity model explains the pattern of bilateral asset holdings reasonably well”. 
Use of the GM in this modification is justified explicitly by the common sense and by the observation that 
the volumes of bilateral trade in financial assets are positively correlated with the size of the economies 
and negatively correlated with transaction costs of trading, while transaction costs are correlated with the 
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distances between the countries. Portes and Rey (2005) also argue that the transaction costs can be 
interpreted as information costs of trading, which are increasing with distance. 
 
The above insight that information costs associated with international interactions could be modeled on 
the basis of the modified gravity model seems to be quite relevant to our analysis. The process of global 
dissemination of information about new institutions and their effectiveness is not without its costs. On 
average countries may find it is easier to acquire, process, and utilize information about new institutions if 
the source of such institutions is based either in the countries that are their geographical neighbors or in 
the countries with whom they have strong cultural links/similarities that make informational exchange 
less costly. This logic would suggest that, on the top of our core hypothesis that bilateral trade drives 
institutional conversion, there are additional reasons to believe that the same standard set of gravity model 
factors (distances, common border and language, etc.13) may be significantly correlated with cross-
country institutional differences.  
 
 
Tested Hypotheses 
We use our model to test the following hypotheses: 
• Institutional distances between countries increase with differences between their levels of 
economic development (measured as difference in per capita GDP); 
• Institutional differences increase in proportion with geographical remoteness of countries. 
That is, the greater geographical distance between any two countries, the greater, ceteris 
paribus, institutional gap between them; 
• Common historical background and cultural heritage, measured by the presence of 
common border and language, even to a greater extent than geographical proximity, 
reduce the range of institutional variation; 
• The structure of international trade flows at the country level (qualitative side of trade 
flows) also influences cross-country institutional variation. That is, similarities in both 
                                                          
13 We would like to emphasize that most of these factors are exogenous with regard to trade and institutions. 
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national trade structures (commodity composition) and degrees of trade openness14 
diminish institutional differences between the countries.  
• Institutional differences are to a significant degree associated with country clustering, on 
one hand, by economic criterions (e.g., OECD members), and, on the other hand, by 
geographic affiliation (main geographic regions), 
• Finally, institutional differences are to a substantial extent related to historical heritage 
and geographical environment. This hypothesis implies that these differences are quite 
steady and highly inertial. Also regional trends or clustering plays a significant role in the 
institutional evolution: particular clusters of the countries located next to each other tend 
to show contemporaneous changes in the institutional quality.15 
Measuring institutional differences 
To measure the differences in the quality of national institutions, we introduce the concept of 
institutional distance between two countries. It is defined as a norm of two vectors in the n-
dimensional vector space of institutional quality. This space is formed by the World Bank family 
of indices World Governance Indicators.16 We choose these indicators for construction of the 
institutional distance measure due to their broad coverage both in terms of the number of 
countries and the time span.  
Family of the WGI indices is a product of the World Bank Institute. Their work was commenced 
at the end of 1990s by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi with Pablo Zoido-
Lobatón. WGI indices are compiled from 1996 and until 2002 were published biannually and 
                                                          
14 For the purposes of our analysis, trade openness seems to be an important complement to the set of standard GM 
factors because it helps to account for the economic scale. Openness reflects the degree of countries’ exposure to 
world trade and therefore it measures the importance (relative to the size of domestic economy) of countries’ 
interactions with trade partners (and with their national institutions). 
15 An example of such a cluster effect is given by a recent simultaneous acceleration of institutional changes in a 
large group of Central European countries due to their accession to the European Union. 
16 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007) 
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since 2002 – annually. These indicators measure governance quality and are based on 33 data 
sources collected from 30 different organizations.17  
Worldwide Governance indicators encompass main aspects of the governance in 212 countries of 
the world, which are reflected in the following six aggregated indicators:18 
1. Voice and accountability 
2. Political stability and absence of violence, 
3. Government effectiveness, 
4. Regulatory quality, 
5. Rule of law, 
6. Control of corruption 
Data used to construct the indices are drawn from various surveys. Each survey results are used 
to create individual indicators that are then combined into 6 aggregated indices. 
We have introduced here two types of the institutional distance measure.. They differ by the 
number of used WGI components, see equation (2) below. The first one is based on only four 
economic components (components 3 – 6: Government effectiveness; Regulatory quality; Rule 
of law; Control of corruption), while the second type includes all six indicators, including the 
political ones (adds Voice and accountability and Political stability and absence of violence). 
 1/2
2
, , , , ,1
 InstDist (Inst Inst )
N
ij t i n t j n tn−
 = −
 ∑  (2) 
where  Inst Distij,t – institutional distance between countries i & j at year t,  
Insti,n,t – value of WGI index n for country i, n=1,…,4 (or 6) at year t. 
For the purpose of this analysis, i.e. analysis of differences in the economic institutions, the 4-
component indicator appears to be advantageous. All its components are directly related to the 
quality of economic institutions. The 2 extra subindices, included in the 6-component indicator, 
                                                          
17 Further information about the data sources used for the construction of the indicators and about the indicators are 
available on the website www.govindicators.org. 
18 See pp. 13-14 above for details. 
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reflect predominantly the quality of political institutions, which, as frequently noted in the 
empirical growth studies literature, are to a smaller extent related to development of trade and 
basic economic inter-actions between the countries. 
However, we prefer to keep the 6-component institutional distance measure in the analysis 
because it provides a broader scope of institutional characteristics and allows for the comparison 
of different types of institutional aspects: both economical and political. Therefore, it will be 
possible to attempt testing whether economic institutions behave similar to political one in this 
framework and check robustness of the model to variation in the design of explained variables. 
International differences in institutional development are explained in this model with the 
following groups of variables: 
A. Factors that influence the intensity of trade interactions between two countries, including 
geographic distances between them, differences in their basic geographic, cultural and 
historical characteristics, membership in the same economic group, location in the same 
geographic region, etc.; 
B. Factors that describe the quality of bilateral trade the countries are engaged in – 
indicators that track variation in national trade structures and in relative intensities of 
trade flows (trade openness); 
C. Control variable: Bilateral differences in the level of economic development.19 
 
 
Model specification 
Depending on the model specification, it is estimated on 6697 or 7705 country-pairs over the 
period of 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2006. 
 
We estimate the following 4 specifications (3-6): 
                                                          
19 Which in their own turn are explained with physical capital accumulation and quality of human capital. Details are 
provided below. 
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1. Basic model 
^
, 0 1 , 2 3 ,
InstDist *Relative GDPc *Dist *Pop Dens
ij t ij t ij ij t
β β β β= + + +  
4 , ,
* T rade O pen
ij t ij t
β ε+ +  
(3) 
2. Basic model with export structure variable (Natural Resources Exports) 
^
, 0 1 , 2 3 ,
InstDist *Relative GDPc *Dist *Pop Dens
ij t ij t ij ij t
β β β β= + + +  
4 , , ,
* T rade O pen * R aw X
ij t ij t ij t
β β ε
5
+ + +  
(4) 
3. Extended model  
^
, 0 1 , 2 3 ,
InstDist *Relative GDPc *Dist *Pop Dens
ij t ij t ij ij t
β β β β= + + +  
4 , 6 7 8
* T rade  O pen * L atitude * L ang * L and lock ed
ij t ij ij ij
β β β β+ + + +  
9 ,
* S am e C ou n try * G rou p  D um m ies
ij ij ij t
β γ ε+ + +  
(5) 
4. Extended model with export structure variable 
^
, 0 1 , 2 3 ,
InstDist *Relative GDPc *Dist *Pop Dens
ij t ij t ij ij t
β β β β= + + +  
4 , , 6 7
* T rade  O pen * R aw X * L atitude * L ang
ij t ij t ij ij
β β β β
5
+ + + +  
8 9 ,
* L and lock ed * S am e C oun try * G roup  D um m ies
ij i j ij i j t
β β γ ε+ + + +  
(6) 
where all variables besides dummies are in logarithms20 so that estimated coefficients can be 
interpreted as elasticities and 
InstDistij,t – Institutional distance between countries i & j at year t, measured in 2 
different ways using WB WGI data, as described above.  
^
,
Relative GDPc
ij t – Ratio of GDP per capita in PPP (2005 prices) for country i & j in year 
t. To ensure consistency of the data, in the nominator of the ratio there is the greater value 
                                                          
20 Here and on by logarithms we refer to natural logarithms. 
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of GDP per capita from the country-pair under consideration. The hat represents fitted 
values of the instrumented variable, see below for details21. Source: WB WDI 2009. 
Dist ij – Geographical distance between countries i & j, measured as weighted distance 
between their main economic centers, i.e. the largest cities in each country. Share of 
population of these cities in the total nation’s population is used as weights.22 Source of 
these and other geographical data: CEPII.23  
Pop Densij,t – product of population density in countries i & j at year t. Source: WB WDI 
2009. 
Trade Open ij,t – absolute difference in trade openness between countries i & j. In its turn, 
trade openness is defined as a ratio of sum of merchandise exports and imports to GDP. 
Source: WB WDI 2009. 
Raw Xij,t –absolute difference in the shares of natural resources exports in merchandise 
exports for countries i & j at year t. Natural resources exports include fuels, ores and 
metals. Source: WB WDI 2009; 
Latitudeij – difference in absolute values of latitudes of countries i & j. E.g., if we have 
two countries, one at latitude 40 North, and another – at 40 South, the value of this 
indicator is 0. Source: CEPII;  
                                                          
21 While our primary research objective is to explore the relationship between institutional differences and a number 
of historical and geographical factors, we are trying to control for several economic factors as well, including 
relative per capita income and differences in trade openness. And, while controlling for income differences, we take 
into account potential endogeneity problems in interaction between income and institutional variables as discussed 
below. 
22  Besides this variable we tried to use several alternative measures of geographical distances for our estimations: 
distances between national economic centers (the largest cities for all countries besides Canada, Russia, and the 
USA, for which two cites (3 for Russia) were chosen in the different regions), distances between the largest cities (1 
city per country), and distances between the capital cities. The most significant results were obtained for the variable 
of weighted distances, next for the economic centers, then for the largest cities, and the least significant – for the 
capitals.  These results appear to be logical.  For large countries intensity of interaction with the rest of the world 
depends not on location of a single city, albeit the largest, but rather on location of several agglomerations, 
geographically dispersed. 
23 Center for Prospective Studies and International Information, http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
Details can be found in Thierry Mayer, Soledad Zignago (2006). 
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Langij – dummy variable equals to 1 if at least 9% of population in both country i & j 
speak the same language, equals to 0 otherwise. Source: CEPII; 
Landlockedij – dummy variable equals to 0 if none of the countries has direct access to 
sea routes, equals to 1 if only one of the countries in the given country pair has such 
access, and equals to 2 if both countries are landlocked. Source: CEPII; 
Same Countryij – dummy variable equals to 1 if both country i & j used to be parts of the 
same state in the past. Source: CEPII; 
Group Dummiesij – vector of dummy variables for main economic blocks / regions of the 
world according to the World Bank’s classification: OECD, EE (East Europe), CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States), LAC (Latin America & Caribbean), EA (East 
Asia), SA (South Asia), MENA, and SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa). In this paper OECD 
block does not include the Eastern European countries that have joined the Organization 
recently. Instead, these countries are accounted for in the EE region. A dummy equals to 
1 if both country i & country j belong to the same group and 0 otherwise. 
εij,t – residual. 
Identification issues 
As noted in the first section, study of growth and institutional development is subject to the 
endogeneity problem. Institutional quality is a factor of economic growth and simultaneously 
growth itself influences the quality of institutions. This is a well recognized problem in the 
empirical literature, though we run a formal test for endogeneity of the relative GDP variable.24 
The null hypothesis of its exogeneity is rejected with p-value = 0.0000 in all our specifications. 
Recognizing this risk of endogeneity, relative GDP per capita is instrumented with variables 
borrowed from the classical economic growth studies (7).  
                                                          
24 The endogeneity test is asymptotically distributed as Chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to a number of 
potentially endogenous regressors and estimated as C statistics, i.e., as difference of 2 J statistics. One is for model 
that treats the variable(s) of interest as exogenous and includes it (them) in the list of IVs, while the other treats it 
(them) as endogenous.  
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 (7) 
where Rel Investment/GDPij,t – absolute difference of Investment to GDP ratios between 
countries i & j at year t,  
 Rel Enrollmentij,t – ratio of enrollment rates in secondary education institutions in 
countries i & j at year t, 
Zij,t – vector of other exogenous variables (both time varying and time invariant), 
ηij,t – residual. 
 
Ratio of enrollment into secondary educational programs and difference in investment to GDP 
ratios are designed to represent, respectively, the role of human capital and investment for 
development. There are several reasons for choice of these variables as instruments: data 
availability and relevance of the instruments. First, these data are available for the large number 
of countries over the long periods of time .Second, the first stage estimation results suggest 
appropriate selection of these instrumental variables, which is reflected in the highly significant 
coefficient estimates. Therefore, our second stage estimation results are not subject to the weak 
instruments problem. 
Setup of the General Method of Moments Model  
Estimation of this overidentified model is conducted under GMM framework. 
All models (3-7) can be compactly written as  
,
'
, ,ij tij t ij t
y z pi ε= +
vv vv
 (8) 
where  
, ,
( In s tD is t ) '
i j t i j t
y =
v  is a vector of dependent variables, either 4-component (WGI4) or 6-
component institutional index (WGI6) for all country pairs, 
, , , , ,
(1, Relative GDPc , Dist , PopDens , TradeOpen , RawX ,
Latit , Lang , Landlocked ,Same Country , Group Dummies ) '
ij t ij t ij ij t ij t ij t
ij ij ij ij ij
z =
v
 
is a vector of explanatory (RHS) variables. Note that it includes presumably endogenous 
Relative GDP per capita variable, but does not include its instruments (Investment in physical 
capital and Human capital), 
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, , , ,
, ,
(1,Dist ,Pop Dens ,Trade Open ,RawX ,
Latit ,Lang ,Landlocked ,Same Country ,Group Dummies ,
Investment/GDP ,Enrollment ) '
ij t ij ij t ij t ij t
ij ij ij ij ij
ij t ij t
x =
v
 
is a vector of exogenous variables. Note that Relative GDP is not included, while its 
instruments – are, 
,i j t
pi
v is a vector of 11 estimated parameters, 
,i j t
ε
v are residuals from the model (3-7) estimation. 
Depending on the estimated model, some of the variables are excluded from the vectors 
of explanatory and predetermined variables. For example,
,
RawX
ij t
 is omitted from (3) and (5), as 
well as L atit , L ang , L andlocked , S am e C oun try , G roup  D um m ies
ij ij ij ij ij
are not included for 
specifications (3) & (4). 
Using the above notations orthogonality or moment conditions can be written as 
, ,
[ ] 0
ij t ij t
E x ε =
vv . The model is linear in parameters. 
As noted above, the results of the first stage estimation were analyzed to choose the set of 
exogenous variables. If the coefficient estimates for the selected instrumental variables were 
insignificant at the first stage that would result in the weak instruments problem at the second 
stage.  
To summarize, the number of estimated parameters is determined by length of vector z
v
, L=11, 
and the number of predetermined variables corresponds to length of the vectorx
v
, K=12. 
Therefore, the model is overidentified, rank condition is satisfied, i.e., Number of orthogonality 
conditions is greater than number of estimated parameters. 
Choice of Weights Matrix and GMM Estimator 
It is natural to assume heteroskedastic disturbances for this model: large dataset (22 000 – 33 000 
country-pair observations, depending on the model specification) includes country pairs that 
substantially differ in many regards, such as economy size, income per capita, human capital, 
structure of economy. This assumption is supported by the results of the Pagan-Hall test for 
heteroskedasticity for all specifications estimated in this paper. Null hypothesis of 
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homoskedasticity is rejected with p-value 0.0000 for all specifications. Therefore, we choose to 
control for clustering of observations by country pairs and use heteroskedasticity consistent, HC, 
estimator (White standard errors). 
Technically, we could use the weights matrix that controls for heteroskedasticity of unknown 
form (but not controlling for clusters) and consistent against autocorrelation, HAC (Newey-West 
standard errors). Yet, the available panel is quite limited in terms of time (8 years with average 
number of year observations per country equal to 4.5), while it includes more than 7 000 clusters. 
Therefore, we prefer to control for clustering rather than autocorrelation. 
Continuously Updated GMM Estimator, CUE, behaves preferably in small samples and is robust 
to weak instruments. However, to check robustness to the choice of estimator we estimate the 
model also with a 2 Step Efficient GMM. As it is shown below the coefficient estimates and 
corresponding confidence intervals produced by both estimators are very close. This result 
suggests robustness of the model to alternative estimators and relevance of the chosen 
instruments. 
 
3. Estimation Results  
This section starts with the presentation of estimation results for the basic model (3) and (4).Then 
it continues with their extension to include geographical and historical/cultural characteristics in 
specifications (5) and (6).  
We would like to emphasize that the following features are common for all specification 
estimates: 
• The estimation results obtained with alternative estimators, 2 Step Efficient GMM 
Estimator and Continuously Updated GMM Estimator, are almost identical. 
• The endogeneity test suggests that relative GDP per capita is endogenous with p-value 
equal to 0.0000. 
• The underidentification test rejects the null hypothesis of underidentification with p-value 
of 0.0000. 
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Basic Specification of the Modified Gravity Model 
The estimation results for the specification (3) are presented in Table 1. First, note that the high 
value of Hansen J statistics suggests misspecification of the model at 1% significance level when 
WGI 6 is used as a dependent variable. If the 4-component institutional index is used, null 
hypothesis (of correct specification) for J statistic is not rejected (p-value 0.3088). 
Coefficient of the relative GDP per capita is estimated positively, i.e., greater differences in 
income are associated with greater institutional differences. Also, the 4-component institutional 
index is more sensitive to differences in income. The coefficient for relative GDP per capita 
when WGI4 is used is 0.178 vs 0.144 when WGI6 is used as a LHS variable.  
 
Geographical distances play similar role for differences in the institutional environment as a 
relative income. However, the estimated coefficient is about twice as small (0.082 for WGI4 and 
0.089 for WGI 6) than for relative GDP per capita and in this case institutional distances 
measured with a 6-component index are more sensitive to this factor. 
 
The coefficient for population density product is negative. It may have the following 
interpretation: All other factors being equal, the pair of countries with higher density of 
population has smaller institutional difference between each other. Higher population density 
may facilitate institutional development (institutional imports from the neighbors) in a way 
similar to how it helps to develop bilateral trade. Though statistically this effect is quite modest 
(-0.014 for WGI4 and -0.010 for WGI6). 
 
Finally, the estimated effect of differences in trade openness on institutional distance is positive 
(0.06 for WGI4 and 0.048 for WGI6). Thus, the hypothesis of greater institutional similarities in 
countries with similar intensities of trade flows is not rejected. 
 
Table 1. Basic specification of the model  
Dependent variable WGI4 2S WGI6 2S WGI4 CUE WGI6 CUE 
Relative GDP per capita 0.178*** 0.144*** 0.178*** 0.144*** 
 (27.91) (26.35) (27.91) (26.37) 
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Geographical Distances 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.082*** 0.089*** 
 (7.29) (8.85) (7.29) (8.83) 
Population Density -0.014** -0.010** -0.014** -0.010** 
 (-3.15) (-2.58) (-3.15) (-2.58) 
Trade Openness 0.060*** 0.048*** 0.060*** 0.048*** 
 (9.11) (8.53) (9.11) (8.53) 
Intercept -0.293** -0.034 -0.293** -0.033 
  (-2.69) (-0.36) (-2.69) (-0.35) 
R-sq uncentered 0.523 0.729 0.523 0.729 
R-sq centered 0.195 0.185 0.195 0.185 
N of observations 32503 32503 32503 32503 
N of clusters 7705 7705 7705 7705 
F statistics 258.180 237.476 258.230 237.618 
J statistic 1.036 10.400 1.036 10.397 
J statistic p-value 0.3088 0.0013 0.3088 0.0013 
J statistic degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1 
LM underidentification test 1820.850 1820.850 1820.850 1820.850 
LM test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM test degrees of freedom 2 2 2 2 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test 47.085 35.586 47.085 35.586 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: GMM estimation. HC clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. All variables are in logs. 
Stars denote significance level: *– p- value < 0.1, ** – p- value< 0.05, *** – p-value< 0.01. 
WGI4 –depended variable is the 4-component institutional index; WGI6 –the 6-component institutional 
index; 2S – 2 Step Efficient GMM Estimator; CUE – Continuously Updated GMM Estimator. 
 
Table 2 contains the estimation results for specification (4). Similarly to specification (3), for 
specification (4) with 4-component institutional distances J test does not reject null hypothesis of 
correct specification of the model, while the option with WGI6 as a dependent variable does not 
pass this test. The results mainly repeat those in Table 1, except that the population density 
becomes insignificant. The added variable, absolute difference in shares of raw materials 
exports, is estimated always positively and almost twice larger (0.039 vs. 0.021) for WGI6 than 
for WGI4.The coefficient for trade openness slightly diminishes (to 0.052 from 0.06 for WGI4).  
 
The results in Table 2 suggest that the natural resource component of exports is a significant 
explanatory factor of institutional differences. Nations with a high share of natural resource 
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exports show greater institutional differences from their peers, i.e. they exhibit institutional 
backwardness, and their political institutions are affected to a greater extent than the economic 
ones. 
 
In other words, the latter estimates suggest that institutional differences grow as the cross-
country differences in the export share of raw materials expand. The “resource curse” concept 
suggests an explanation of this result.  The Resource curse affects institutional development 
through different channels (Moore, 1998; Tornell and Lane, 1999). First, in the natural resource 
abundant countries there is insufficiency of incentives to reform their institutional framework, 
since political elites enjoy major benefits from the exploitation of the national natural resource 
sector under the existing, but sub-optimal, institutional framework. The consequence is weak 
governance and poor institutional climate, and this undermines incentives for investment in the 
country, unless an investor develops special relationships with the governing elites. Second, 
problems in investment climate are aggravated by Dutch Disease (appreciation of the national 
currency, decline of the tradables sector, lower incomes in the non-resource extractive sector). 
 
 
Table 2. Basic specification and resource curse 
Dependent variable WGI4 2S WGI6 2S WGI4 CUE WGI6 CUE 
Relative GDP per capita 0.184*** 0.149*** 0.184*** 0.149*** 
 (26.65) (25.36) (26.66) (25.38) 
Geographical Distances 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 
 (5.66) (7.09) (5.66) (7.08) 
Population Density -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.001 
 (-1.28) (0.28) (-1.28) (0.28) 
Trade Openness 0.052*** 0.043*** 0.052*** 0.043*** 
 (7.22) (6.90) (7.22) (6.91) 
Raw Materials Exports 0.021*** 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.039*** 
 (3.46) (7.54) (3.46) (7.54) 
Intercept -0.285* -0.126 -0.285* -0.125 
  (-2.37) (-1.18) (-2.37) (-1.18) 
R-sq uncentered 0.511 0.719 0.511 0.719 
R-sq centered 0.197 0.191 0.197 0.191 
N of observations 26733 26733 26733 26733 
N of clusters 6697 6697 6697 6697 
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F statistics 175.564 168.685 175.587 168.733 
J statistic 0.200 5.328 0.200 5.327 
J statistic p-value 0.6544 0.0210 0.6544 0.0210 
J statistic degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1 
LM underidentification test 1576.293 1576.293 1576.293 1576.293 
LM test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM test degrees of freedom 2 2 2 2 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test 61.860 50.026 61.860 50.026 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: GMM estimation. HC clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. All variables in logs. 
Stars denote significance level: *– p- value < 0.1, ** – p- value< 0.05, *** – p-value< 0.01. 
WGI4 – regressand is the 4 component institutional index; WGI6 – regressand is the 6 component 
institutional index; 2S – 2 Step Efficient GMM Estimator; CUE – Continuously Updated GMM 
Estimator. 
 
 
Extended Specification of the Modified Gravity Model 
Table 3 and Table 4 present estimations of 2 additional specifications (5 and 6) of our modified 
gravity model. Additional specifications are based on the earlier specifications (3 and 4), 
respectively, and extended to include extra explanatory variables that control for geographical 
and historical differences across the countries. We would like to emphasize that both 
specifications 5 and 6 pass Hansen J statistic test for overidentification. 
Table 3 represents the results for the extended model. One of the main findings is that once the 
new explanatory variables were added, the estimate for the geographical distances coefficient 
decreased in absolute value and changed its sign (to -0.077 for WGI4 and -0.058 for WGI6). 
This suggests that geography is an important factor of institutional development, but not per se. 
It operates through other variables, included in the extended specification, such as trade-related 
geographical and cultural characteristics. Thus, the initially observed in the basic model effect of 
geographical distance on institutional differences disappears, as the new variables are added. 
Yet, the extended specification with regional dummies is preferred to the basic model, since it 
gives more detailed information on the drivers of institutional differences than just a single 
geographical distances variable. 
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Relative GDP per capita and population density coefficients maintain their respective signs and 
so does the interpretation of these estimates. The value of the relative GDP coefficient 
moderately decreases for both 4- and 6-component institutional distances (0.171/0.134 vs. 
0.178/0.144 in specification (3)).  
Population density is significant for both WGI4 and WGI6 with respective coefficient values of -
0.016/-0.011. 
Absolute difference of latitudes is estimated positively (0.012/0.011), which point to the fact that 
countries located at an approximately same distance from equator have on average similar 
institutional characteristics. 
The coefficient for landlocked dummy is positive (0.091/0.085), which reflects importance of 
direct access to sea routes for institutional development. Note that this variable takes value of 1 if 
only one of the countries in the given country pair is landlocked and 2 if both are. Thus model 
predicts that if both countries in any pair are landlocked, this considerably affects their 
institutional convergence -- they will have on average 17-18% greater institutional distance from 
each other than in the pair where two countries have sea access. This result supports the 
hypothesis that trade facilitates institutional changes. 
The effect of common language is estimated negatively at 1% confidence level with the 
coefficient of -0.103/-0.074, i.e. greater absolute value for WGI4 specification, i.e. common 
language, as expected, supports institutional similarities (smaller institutional distances), i.e. 
convergence. 
Being parts of the same country in the past suggests exposure to the common history, culture, 
and language. Some or all of these characteristics vary with the length of being within a single 
state and length of time that passed after gaining independence (break-up), therefore, this is 
another factor, which potentially can explain differences in the institutional environment. This 
coefficient is estimated negatively, with the p-value equal to 0.073/0.053. 
The set of geographical dummies that indicates whether the countries are members of the same 
political or economical unions or are located in the same geographical region further improves 
the model. We observe that indeed national institutional characteristics are closer between the 
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countries that jointly belong to such unions (with exception on Eastern Asian countries, which 
apparently exhibit extreme heterogeneity within their own group). 
As was noted above, J statistic is low for specifications with both dependent variables, therefore, 
hypothesis of correct model identification is not rejected. 
Table 3. Extended specification of the modified gravity model  
Dependent variable WGI4 2S WGI6 2S WGI4 CUE WGI6 CUE 
Relative GDP per capita 0.171*** 0.134*** 0.171*** 0.134*** 
 (30.84) (29.49) (30.84) (29.50) 
Geographical Distances -0.077*** -0.058*** -0.077*** -0.058*** 
 (-6.47) (-5.71) (-6.47) (-5.71) 
Population Density -0.016*** -0.011** -0.016*** -0.011** 
 (-3.87) (-3.14) (-3.87) (-3.14) 
Trade Openness 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 
 (7.43) (6.70) (7.43) (6.70) 
Absolute Difference of Latitudes 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (22.36) (23.43) (22.37) (23.43) 
Common Language -0.103*** -0.074*** -0.103*** -0.074*** 
 (-5.51) (-4.94) (-5.51) (-4.94) 
Landlocked 0.091*** 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.085*** 
 (6.25) (6.83) (6.25) (6.84) 
Same Country in the past -0.122* -0.116* -0.122* -0.116* 
 (-1.79) (-1.94) (-1.79) (-1.94) 
OECD -0.549*** -0.643*** -0.549*** -0.643*** 
 (-11.79) (-15.78) (-11.79) (-15.78) 
EE -0.647*** -0.753*** -0.647*** -0.753*** 
 (-7.52) (-8.69) (-7.52) (-8.68) 
CIS -0.895*** -0.665*** -0.895*** -0.665*** 
 (-10.83) (-11.85) (-10.83) (-11.85) 
LAC -0.278*** -0.287*** -0.278*** -0.287*** 
 (-5.18) (-6.25) (-5.18) (-6.25) 
EA -0.169 -0.104 -0.169 -0.104 
 (-1.56) (-1.38) (-1.56) (-1.38) 
SA -0.336* -0.333** -0.336* -0.333** 
 (-1.79) (-2.25) (-1.79) (-2.25) 
MENA -0.151** -0.166*** -0.151** -0.166*** 
 (-2.75) (-3.41) (-2.75) (-3.42) 
SSA -0.428*** -0.324*** -0.428*** -0.324*** 
 (-10.65) (-9.61) (-10.65) (-9.61) 
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Intercept 0.963*** 1.128*** 0.963*** 1.128*** 
  (8.39) (11.70) (8.39) (11.70) 
R-sq uncentered 0.593 0.778 0.593 0.778 
R-sq centered 0.314 0.333 0.314 0.333 
N of observations 32503 32503 32503 32503 
N of clusters 7705 7705 7705 7705 
F statistics 225.387 234.268 225.392 234.236 
J statistic 0.095 1.530 0.095 1.530 
J statistic p-value 0.7585 0.2161 0.7585 0.2162 
J statistic degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1 
LM underidentification test 1728.769 1728.769 1728.769 1728.769 
LM test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM test degrees of freedom 2 2 2 2 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test 20.989 12.858 20.989 12.858 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test p-value 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0003 
 
Notes: GMM estimation. HC clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. All variables in logs. 
Stars denote significance level: *– p- value < 0.1, ** – p- value< 0.05, *** – p-value< 0.01. 
WGI4 – regressand is the 4 component institutional index; WGI6 – regressand is the 6 component 
institutional index; 2S – 2 Step Efficient GMM Estimator; CUE – Continuously Updated GMM 
Estimator. 
 
Specification (6) extends model (5), in a way similar to how the specification (4) extended 
specification (3), i.e. by adding the share of raw materials exports variable to test the resource 
curse hypothesis for the extended model. Results are very similar to the specification (5). Note 
that if WGI4 is used as an explained variable, raw materials export is estimated with p-value 
equal to 0.074. For WGI6 the specification coefficient estimate is significant at the 1% 
confidence level. Once again, we interpret these results as evidence of resource curse that hinders 
institutional development and institutional convergence. 
 
The coefficient of the same country dummy is still estimated negatively, however, the p-value 
has increased to 0.11/0.103. Probably, after we control in the model for language, being 
landlocked, latitude differences, and raw materials exports, the amount of new information 
contained in the same country dummy is relatively limited. 
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Table 4. Extended specification and resource curse 
Dependent variable WGI4 2S WGI6 2S WGI4 CUE WGI6 CUE 
Relative GDP per capita 0.175*** 0.137*** 0.175*** 0.137*** 
 (28.51) (27.41) (28.50) (27.41) 
Geographical Distances -0.083*** -0.065*** -0.083*** -0.065*** 
 (-6.59) (-6.06) (-6.59) (-6.06) 
Population Density -0.013** -0.005 -0.013** -0.005 
 (-2.62) (-1.24) (-2.62) (-1.24) 
Trade Openness 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 
 (5.40) (4.93) (5.40) (4.93) 
Raw Materials Exports 0.010* 0.025*** 0.010* 0.025*** 
 (1.79) (5.21) (1.79) (5.21) 
Absolute Difference of Latitudes 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (18.70) (20.06) (18.70) (20.06) 
Common Language -0.094*** -0.066*** -0.094*** -0.066*** 
 (-4.60) (-3.98) (-4.60) (-3.98) 
Landlocked 0.075*** 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.062*** 
 (4.61) (4.48) (4.61) (4.48) 
Same Country in the past -0.119 -0.106 -0.119 -0.106 
 (-1.60) (-1.63) (-1.60) (-1.63) 
OECD -0.542*** -0.615*** -0.542*** -0.615*** 
 (-11.49) (-14.87) (-11.49) (-14.87) 
EE -0.646*** -0.731*** -0.646*** -0.731*** 
 (-7.44) (-8.37) (-7.45) (-8.37) 
CIS -0.981*** -0.730*** -0.981*** -0.730*** 
 (-9.88) (-10.91) (-9.88) (-10.91) 
LAC -0.249*** -0.261*** -0.249*** -0.261*** 
 (-4.27) (-5.26) (-4.27) (-5.26) 
EA -0.262** -0.151* -0.262** -0.151* 
 (-2.18) (-1.86) (-2.18) (-1.86) 
SA -0.315 -0.339* -0.315 -0.339* 
 (-1.51) (-2.16) (-1.51) (-2.16) 
MENA -0.210*** -0.201*** -0.210*** -0.201*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.64) (-3.43) (-3.64) 
SSA -0.455*** -0.347*** -0.455*** -0.347*** 
 (-9.70) (-8.92) (-9.70) (-8.92) 
Intercept 0.996*** 1.104*** 0.996*** 1.104*** 
  (8.03) (10.51) (8.03) (10.51) 
R-sq uncentered 0.578 0.766 0.578 0.766 
R-sq centered 0.307 0.328 0.307 0.328 
N of observations 26733 26733 26733 26733 
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N of clusters 6697 6697 6697 6697 
F statistics 163.623 174.271 163.633 174.252 
J statistic 0.535 0.465 0.535 0.465 
J statistic p-value 0.4644 0.4955 0.4644 0.4955 
J statistic degrees of freedom 1 1 1 1 
LM underidentification test 1496.262 1496.262 1496.262 1496.262 
LM test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
LM test degrees of freedom 2 2 2 2 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test 34.777 25.847 34.777 25.847 
Endogeneity of relative GDP test p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Notes: GMM estimation. HC clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. All variables in logs. 
Stars denote significance level: *– p- value < 0.1, ** – p- value< 0.05, *** – p-value< 0.01. 
WGI4 – regressand is the 4 component institutional index; WGI6 – regressand is the 6 component 
institutional index; 2S – 2 Step Efficient GMM Estimator; CUE – Continuously Updated GMM 
Estimator. 
Conclusions 
 
Using the modified gravity model of trade, we studied institutional differences among more than 
100 countries of the world over the period of 1996 – 2006. Our main findings and conclusions 
could be summarized as follows: 
• Geographical and historical factors are significant determinants of cross-country 
differences in the institutional quality. Factors that are commonly considered to be 
drivers of bilateral commodity trade (distance, common language, being landlocked, 
membership in the same regional group) facilitate similarities in the levels of institutional 
development, i.e. institutional convergence. These results are received when we control 
for cross-country differences in per capita incomes. 
• The obtained results suggest that institutional progress has some specific geographic 
patterns. Institutional progress in a given country depends on its physical (territorial) 
neighborhood. Countries tend to cluster by the level of their institutional development. 
Import of institutions is stimulated by demonstration effects from the nearby states. 
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• Institutional development is facilitated by participation in international trade, and could 
take the form of import of new institutions from major trade partners. This is because 
participation in the international trade strengths the demand for more advanced 
institutions, stimulates adopting institutions from more developed partners. Countries 
with a similar level of trade openness, ceteris paribus, tend to demonstrate smaller 
institutional differences. 
• Institutional similarities and differences are to a large extent determined by the 
commodity structure of trade flows. Dominance of trade in raw materials, as measured by 
absolute differences in shares of raw materials exports, (all other factors being equal) 
influences institutional progress negatively, it tends to increase institutional distances, 
especially if political institutions are included in the analysis. 
• The model is robust to different measures of institutional distances used as dependent 
variables and therefore helps to explain both differences in economic institutions and in 
political and economic institutions combined. 
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